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INTRODUCTION
The recent BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico which
adversely affected the shore of Florida has provoked an
outburst of accusations of corporate irresponsibility,
particularly in the US, and one should appreciate the
reasons for it. It has not only caused environmental damage
but also cost the livelihood of numerous local firms and
families, in addition to depleting or harming many
resources of the Gulf of Mexico.
Whether the perpetrators of the damage, harm and
suffering to human and animal lives were caused by BP
directly or by their agent, from a legal standpoint BP
cannot avoid liability under the principle of vicarious
liability. The extent to which BP directly contributed to the
disaster will be revealed in due course. BP has already paid
a large sum of money to the locals (US$ 256 m) in the
form of compensation for damage caused to those who
suffered from the catastrophic disaster, and it agreed to
another US$ 60 million in August. By agreeing to pay
compensation BP has admitted its liability, even though no
contractual arrangement existed between BP and those
who suffered from this disaster. So what is the basis for this
compensation, and did BP agree to pay it on the grounds
of the breach of corporate responsibility, or the principle of
corporate social responsibility, or both?
The aim of this article is to identify and briefly examine
the legal issues that arose out of this incident. The reader’s
attention is drawn to the fact that despite the authors’ best
efforts much data was not made available to them; hence in
many cases assumptions are used which seek to make a best
guess in the circumstances.
THE SCENARIO
Earlier this year, oil spillage started in the Gulf of
Mexico, causing environmental damage and death or harm
to sea birds. Newspaper reports claim that the number of
sea birds affected by the spillage stood at over 4,400. When
the Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska in 1989, up to
250,000 birds were thought to have perished.
According to BP, it made its best efforts/endeavours to
cap the spillage, but it failed to do so successfully. If and
when the oil spillage could be completely stopped, the
company would be required to clear the waters in the Gulf
and bring them back to their normal state. The whole
episode has been very damaging to BP. In addition to the
cost of financial compensation, BP suffered a high profile
casualty with the departure of its Chief Executive, Tony
Hayward. BP’s reputation as one of the largest corporate
entities in the world has been tarnished; in London,
environmentalists managed to have some of the BP’s oil
pumps closed at least for a day as a gesture in their protest
against the company’s perceived irresponsibility towards
the sufferers of the disaster and the community at large. BP
will be required to do more and spend even more money
to regain its good image and prove that it is a socially
responsible corporate entity after all.
WHY ARE THE US AND PART OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SO ANGRY
WITH BP?
The economic loss for the sufferers of the disaster is
enormous and far reaching. The blackened beaches in the
Gulf of Mexico are a constant reminder of the alleged
irresponsibility of BP in contributing to the disaster. BP
and its agents may also be accused of gross negligence in
dealing with the problem, and the shareholders also
suffered a financial jolt.
In 2005, BP’s refinery in Texas City caught fire, killing
15 workers and injuring more than 170 others. BP was
fined and heavily criticised for numerous safety violations.
In 2006, BP’s pipelines in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, were found
to be corroded and leaking oil. Four years later, a repetition
of a similar and larger incident was enough to push
sufferers and sympathisers to the limit.
Curiously enough, it is common knowledge that BP is a
company which believes in and maintains the principle of
corporate social responsibility, and yet the Gulf of Mexico
oil disaster required it to pay a huge price because it was
construed by the disaster-stricken community and its
sympathisers as a socially irresponsible act on the part of a
corporate entity which earns staggering amounts of profits.
But the current disaster had a political twist too. The
Gulf of Mexico oil spill received the highest attention of
the US media. President Obama was determined not to
stand accused of any indifference or negligence as his
predecessor had been when Hurricane Katrina caused a
The Gulf of Mexico oil
disaster: some legal issues
by C Chatterjee and Anna Lefcovitch
disaster in the same area; the episode was politicised by the
president’s office when the president’s personal popularity
was at a low ebb in view of the current unemployment level
in the US, although he should be commended for his
performance in regard to many US issues.
During the immediate past, that is before Mr Hayward
took over as Chief Executive, there was a perception that
BP was very concerned with giving greater returns to its
shareholders – even, some claimed, by compromising on
safety (corporate social responsibility?). Mr Hayward also
pursued a policy of greater satisfaction for BP’s investors (a
perfect gesture of corporate responsibility). Perhaps a
different kind of corporate leadership was necessary which
would combine profits with safety and reliable
technological operation. The business of BP is “risk-
prone” rather than “risk-free.” These risks were
foreseeable.
WAS BP LEGALLY LIABLE TO PAY THE
VICTIMS OF THE DISASTER?
It must be pointed out at the outset that BP did not have
any contractual relationship with the victims of the disaster;
in other words, there was no privity between the two
parties. But what is the source of this obligation whereby
BP agreed to pay compensation, and indeed did so?
There was no contractual obligation for BP to pay
compensation, and the payment of compensation was
based on two grounds: (a) a gesture of moral responsibility,
the modern term of which is corporate social responsibility
(BP, according to many, was in breach of this); and (b) BP’s
failure to correct the spillage promptly enough, which has
been described as “negligence” on the part of BP.
Thus, to put it succinctly, although BP made its best
efforts/ endeavours to cap the sources of spillage, the
extent of damage caused to the local community and the
need to protect its image decided the company to pay
compensation. Two legal issues arise from this situation: (a)
what was the nature of the negligence – deliberate or
unforeseeable? (b) what efforts did BP make to minimise
the cause of the disaster?
By paying compensation, BP admitted its liability in
negligence, but the extent of the nature of negligence and
the compensation should have been judicially determined,
based on experts’ opinions; otherwise, speculation would
be the determining factor for calculating compensation.
The causal link between the oil spillage and the disaster
entailing economic and environmental damage needs to be
clearly established; it must be direct and not remote. The
other issue remains whether the spillage was occasioned
recklessly by BP – the circumstances of the case do not
suggest so – when it happened. If the issue is raised of
whether the perpetrator of the negligent act had a safety
management system in place, and the answer is in the
negative, then this will have a greater impact on liability.
However, even in the case of innocent negligence,
reparation must be paid; thus, liability may not be avoided
either way. Public emotion, which is not a legal criterion,
should not form the basis for calculating compensation.
When a disaster on such a scale tales place, the accused
is liable to pay not only the victims but also contribute
towards the environmental damage caused by the act.
Here, the ordinary principle of the law of negligence
applies – do not harm your neighbours. Furthermore,
under customary international law, environmental
pollution and damage caused thereby are impermissible
(see Trail Smelter Arbitration 1938- 1941, Annual Digest and
Reports of Public International Law Case 1938-41, vol 9 at
315, and subsequent international conventions on the
Protection of the Environment; and see also the Rio
Declaration of 1992). In BP’s case, the adverse effect of oil
spillage became so evident that it had no other choice but
to accept liability. The economic losses sustained by the
families and industries were enough to establish the causal
link between the oil spillage and those losses. Human
emotions ran high. The disaster became a national issue,
and the Chief Executive of BP was required to appear
before a US Congressional Committee.
Irrespective of the efforts made by BP to cap the source
of the oil spillage, politicisation of the disaster and its
consequential effect on the local communities necessitated
a proper negotiation of the scheme of compensation. The
extent of negligence on the part of the BP dominated the
scenario; the issue of force majeure or unforeseeable
circumstances leading to the disaster was relegated to a
secondary position. BP became virtually defenceless.
What has never been disclosed to date was whether the
oil spillage was caused by non-technological reasons,
including the factors at the sea level which would
overpower the protective/preventative capacity of the
technology involved; in other words, whether the changing
conditions at the bottom of the sea contributed to the
disaster and if the technological device used, however
sophisticated, could have withstood the rigour of those
conditions.
WHEN “BEST EFFORTS” OR “BEST
ENDEAVOURS” WOULD NOT BE AN
EXCUSE
The term “effort” according to the Concise Oxford English
Dictionary (2002) means “a rigorous or determined
attempt.” “Endeavour”, on the other hand, stands for
“earnest and industrious effort.” An alternative meaning of
“endeavour”, according to the same source, is to exert
oneself or to use effort or to attempt strenuously. Thus,
from a legal standpoint, it would be difficult to maintain a
distinction between “efforts” and “endeavours” or
between “best efforts” and “best endeavours”. Reasonable
efforts or endeavours therefore imply only diminutive
standards of “effort” or “endeavour”.18
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The terms “best efforts” or “best endeavours” tend to
signify that a contributing party cannot be expected to
perform or act beyond certain limits. Neither may be
measured or quantified. One might argue that the quality
of an effort or endeavour should be determined by
reference to the relevant circumstances – but the fact
remains that a degree of value judgment enters into the
process of determining best efforts or best endeavours.
Contractual obligations are of an absolute nature; these
may be not qualified by terms such as best efforts, best
endeavours, reasonable efforts or reasonable endeavours.
No compromise of contractual obligations is permissible.
Furthermore, contractual obligations must be performed
with diligence by each party to a contract. In the case of
alleged negligence in performing contractual obligations,
negligence must be established by referring to the
principles of the law of negligence which entails “causality”
– causal connection between the negligent act and the
injury/damage caused to victims by it, in addition to
satisfying the criterion of whether due care and skill have
been exercised.
Interestingly enough, in Dahl v Nelson [1881] 6 AC 38
the court referred to the term “reasonable performance”
but entered the caveat that what is reasonable must be
determined having regard to the circumstances of the
particular case. In Sheffield District Railway v Great Central
Railway (1911) 27 TLR 451 the plaintiffs filed an action
against the defendants alleging that the railway company, in
breach of their obligations under the lease, failed to use
their “best endeavours” to develop the through and local
traffic of the Sheffield Railway. According to the court, the
term “best endeavours” does not mean second-best
endeavours.
In Terrell v Mabic Todd & Co (1952) 69 RPC 234 the
defendants agreed to make their best endeavours to
promote the sale of as many fountain pens made under
certain designated letters patent as reasonably possible in
certain countries, and to place the invention on the market
and exploit it with all diligence. A similar contract was
made by the defendant for promoting the sale of bottles of
ink. The defendants failed to perform their contractual
obligations and effectively repudiated the contracts, but
defended their position by maintaining that their
obligation was to use ordinary “business endeavours” and
normal diligence.
“... the defendants’ obligation was at least that of taking
reasonable steps to exploit their inventions and design having
regard both to the interests of their shareholders and their
contractual obligations to the plaintiffs, that they had failed
in this obligation” (at p 235).
In Terrell, business endeavours was equated with
“reasonable steps” to exploit the inventions by the
defendants, and even an undertaking to take reasonable
steps was construed to be binding.
From a legal standpoint, it may be maintained that “best
endeavours” stands for a lesser rather than an absolute
obligation. A contractual obligation is absolute in nature,
and that obligation cannot be compromised. Either there
would be a breach of the contractual terms, or in order to
avoid a breach the parties to the contract may prefer to re-
negotiate the terms of their contract, which act cannot be
prevented under any legal system because the parties have
agreed to do so.
Breach of contractual obligation(s) is one thing, but
contractual negligence is another; the latter arises from
negligence in performing the contractual obligations. But
action on breach of contract or in negligence may be
brought by the affected party to the contract – the
principle of privity of contract.
According to Sheffield District Railway the term “best
endeavours” means:
“... what the words say, they do not mean second-best
endeavours ... they cannot be construed to mean that the
Great Central must give half or any specific proportion of its
trade to the Sheffield District. They do not mean that the
Great Central must so conduct its business as to offend its
traders and drive them to competing routes. They do not
mean that the limits of reason must be overstepped with
regard to the cost of the services; but short of these
qualifications the words mean that the Great Central
Company must, broadly speaking, leave no stone unturned to
develop traffic on the Sheffield District line” (at p 452).
The court in this decision defined “best endeavours”.
What the court meant was that endeavours made by a
defendant cannot be a “second-best”; “best” does not
admit of any categorisation.
It is against such a dictum that BP or its agents will be
required to establish that they made their best endeavours
to seal the sources of leakage of oil in the Gulf of Mexico.
But even then BP may not be able to avoid its liability
under the principle of vicarious liability.
Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 was not directly
concerned with the legal interpretation of the term “best
endeavours” in a contract. Lord Ackner however
incidentally explained the legal implication of the term
when he stated, inter alia, that:
“The reason why an agreement to negotiate, like an
agreement to agree, is unenforceable, is simply because it lacks
the necessary certainty. The same does not apply to an
agreement to use best endeavours” (p 38).
Little v Courage [1995] 70 P&CR 469 was not directly
concerned with the issue of exercising best endeavours by
the defendant. However, in dealing with the case, Millett
LJ, as he then was, explained the legal implication of the
term when he stated that: 19
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“An undertaking to use one’s best endeavours to obtain
planning permission or an export licence is sufficiently certain
and is capable of being enforced.”
Incidentally, UBH (Mechanical Services) Ltd v Standard Life
Assurance Co The Times, November 13, 1986, dealt with the
issue of a tenant’s covenant to use reasonable endeavours
in the performance of the tenant’s obligations under the
lease. According to the court, the covenant to use
reasonable endeavours was less onerous than one to use
best endeavours.
John Mowlem v Eagle Star (1995) CILL 1047 was
concerned with whether Mowlem’s obligation to secure
completion was merely an obligation to exercise its best
endeavours to so complete. The Court of Appeal answered
the question in the negative.
The gas sales agreement (GSA) in Phillips Petroleum Co UK
Ltd & Ors v Enron Europe Ltd [1997] CLC 329 contained the
term “best endeavours or reasonable endeavours”. Relying on
Little v Courage, Colman, J said that:
“A provision requiring a party to use ‘its best endeavours’ to
agree will in general be unenforceable, for that is just as
incapable of enforcement by reference to objective criteria as an
agreement to agree.”
On the basis of these decisions it is possible to conclude
that the terms “best efforts” or “best endeavours” or
“reasonable efforts or endeavours” may not exonerate a
defendant from the burden of contractual obligations.
On the other hand, in Midland Land Reclamation Ltd and
Leicestershire County Council v Warren Energy Ltd (1997) CILL
1222, Judge Bowsher stated that:
“To be satisfied of a breach of ‘best endeavours’ clause by one
party or the other, I would wish to hear evidence that in the
light of the knowledge available at the time of the alleged
default the party alleged to be in default was culpable. In
assessing culpability, I also take into account the unfriendly
nature of the environment” (at p 1124).
This is what BP might rely upon; that the environment
in the deep sea contributed to the disaster but that will
need evidence to establish the absence of their culpability.
Recently, in CEP Holdings Ltd & CEP Claddings v Steni AS
[2009] EWHC 2447 (QB) the legal effect of “reasonable
endeavours” was considered by the High Court. In this
case the defendant served notice to terminate its exclusive
distribution agreement with CEP on the grounds that CEP
failed to comply with its express obligations under the
agreement “to use all reasonable endeavours” to promote
and sell certain products in the UK and Eire. According to
the court, the parties must have understood the term “all
reasonable endeavours” to mean that CEP and/or
Claddings should have done everything that a reasonably
competent distributor would have done to promote the
sales of Steni’s product in that territory. Based on the
evidence, or the lack of it, to justify reasonable endeavours
made by the claimants, the court found in favour of the
defendant. Thus, in this case, the court maintained that the
agreement “to use all reasonable endeavours” would be
enforceable in the context of this case.
Whether “best efforts” or “best endeavours” have been
made by the accused in correcting the cause of the disaster,
it is to be emphasised that irrespective of any privity
between the accused and the victims an obligation arises to
protect the interests of the victims; and that obligation may
be more onerous than the contractual obligation owing to
the lack of care. Furthermore, when the adverse effect of
all affects the interests, financial or otherwise, of those who
are innocent and did not contribute to the negligent act.
In so far as a negligent act is concerned, the lack of
foreseeability of the occurrence of the act if established by
the accused would be enough to establish negligence. In
the case of technology-based industries, the foreseeability
of the failure of technology must be assumed. Thus there
exists a continuing responsibility for “maintenance” of the
technology. In the case of such industries, the lack of
foreseeability of failure of technology may not be a defence.
That the technology will perform in its best possible
capacity in the circumstances / environment in which it is
so intended to perform is also part of foreseeability.
If a disaster takes place despite satisfying the condition
of “foreseeability” then the duty of the accused /
perpetrator would be to minimise the consequences of the
disaster properly and effectively. This obligation does not
arise from any contract; it arises from the general notion
that thou shalt not do any harm to anybody, a notion on
which the law of negligence is based. In the Union Carbide
case (1986) 25 ILM 771 the liability of Union Carbide was
established not by directly relying on any rules of
customary international law, but on the harm theory.
When harm is caused, the accused must compensate the
victims of the harm, and correct the harm promptly and
effectively. Whether these two functions were performed
by the accused would be determined by reference to its
acts to correct the harm caused. “Best endeavours” or
“best efforts” made to correct it promptly and effectively,
but not fully corrected, may not be an excuse.
Thus, in determining the breach of a best endeavour
clause and the degree of culpability of the accused in regard
to a negligent act, external factors, such as the “unfriendly
nature of the environment,” may have to be taken into
account. As stated earlier, in dealing with BP’s liability in
negligence by not using best endeavours, it is important
that the unfriendly nature of the environment at the
bottom of the sea is taken into account.
RESPONSIBILITY OF OIL POLLUTERS
It is elementary that oil companies must not cause any
environmental damage including the pollution of seas or
any other water courses. The “polluter pays” principle has
been incorporated into the Rio Declaration of 1992,20
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principle 13 of which provides that:
“States shall develop national law regarding liability and
compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage. States shall also co-operate in an
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further
international law regarding liability and compensation for
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities
within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their
jurisdiction.”
The crucial words in this article are “compensation for
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by
activities within their jurisdiction.” Environmental damage
may be caused by state itself or another entity, local or
foreign within its jurisdiction.
This responsibility is of an absolute nature. As stated
earlier, this need not be a contractual responsibility. This is
a responsibility erga ones. The act itself gives rise to
responsibility towards the entire world. That pollution of
the environment gives rise to international liability in torts
was established in the Trail Smelter Arbitration. Principle 2 of
the Rio Declaration provides that:
“States have in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and development policies, and the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN
CONTRACTUAL AND NON-CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS
The dividing line between contractual and non-
contractual obligations is gradually vanishing. A tort action
is generally perceived as an action for damages, but a
claimant may seek damages for breach of a contractual
obligation; the breach is often an outcome of negligence in
performing the contractual obligations.
In bringing an action in negligence, no privity between
the wrongdoer and the wronged need necessarily be
established. The causation will do – the causal connection
between the causation of the harm and its effect on the
victim must be proved. It is possible that the same
circumstances may give rise to both an action for a breach
of contract and the other for an action in tort.
In Edward v Mallan [1908] 1 KB 1002 the court held that
the existence of a contract for the provision of medical
treatment did not preclude an action for breach of the
implied duties of care and skill which must be construed as
the foundation of the law of negligence.
There is no reason why this principle may not be applied
to the Gulf of Mexico episode. Based on the decision in
Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963] 2 All ER 575 it may be
maintained that professionals (BP’s appointed experts in
installing the oil extraction system) must appreciate that at
common law, which system is also followed by the US,
their potential legal responsibilities may be derived from
the principle of both the law of contract and the law of
torts. JEB Fasteners Ltd v Marks Bloom & Co [1981] 3 All ER
289 held, inter alia, that despite making best endeavours,
in performing contractual obligations if any additional
liability arises, whether to a party to a contract or a third
party akin to the contract, the defendant may not have any
grounds for seeking relief. A contracting party or the
management of a corporate entity must avoid liability by
providing the excuse that in performing its contractual
obligations, it followed acceptable commercial practice
(Edwards v Mellan at p 1002). Performance of contractual
obligations with due care and skill and without any
negligence is an absolute obligation for a contracting party.
In Esso Petroleum v Mardon [1976] 2 All ER 5, Lord
Denning said that:
“... in the case of a professional man, the duty to use
reasonable care arises not only from contract, and is therefore
actionable in tort as well.”
The same judicial principle may also be applied to
engineering contracts. Engineering and construction works
can never the totally risk-free. Hence the need for
continuing supervision of such projects (see the Bhopal
case); otherwise, it would give rise to contractual negligence
signifying that the appropriate standards of care and skill
were not maintained in performing contractual obligations.
Engineers, contractors and sub-contractors owe a duty of
care to those whom they serve. There thus exists a duty in
contracts as well in torts, and there also exists dual or
concurrent contract and tort duties (see Donoghue v Stevenson
[1932] AC 562). Out of the same contract two types of
cause of action may arise – see Sidway v Bethlem Royal Hospital
Governors [1985] 1 All ER 143 and Gold Harringey Health
Authority [1987] 2 All ER 888. In the field of engineering /
construction contracts, no distinction can be made between
the duty of care and skill owed by the contractor to the
employer in contract and that in the tort of negligence –
Cassidy v Ministry of Health [1957] 1 All ER 574 and Esso
Petroleum v Mardon – save that in the case of contract this duty
arises by reason of the terms implied by the law (Thake v
Maurice [1986] 1 All ER 497) and in the case of torts under
a duty imposed by the law (Esso Petroleum at 5).
As to standards of care, it is expected that in discharging
its duty of care, an entity must demonstrate a competent
degree of skill (Eyre v Measday [1986] 1 All ER 488). “Skill”
cannot be compared with the ordinary competence of the
reasonable man; it is the result of aptitude developed by
special training and experience. In other words, when
undertaking work requiring special skills, professionals and
professional entities are required not only to exercise
reasonable care but also to satisfy the standards of 21
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proficiency that can be expected of persons of their
profession (Gold v Harringey Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER
888; Wilsher v Essex AHA [1986] 3 All ER 801; Bolam v Friern
Hospital Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118;
Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 All ER 267 and Maynard v West
Midlands RHA [1985] 1 All ER 635).
In setting standards of care, the law of negligence
disregards any subjective element; it defines negligence in
an objective fashion. An error in engineering judgment,
though made without any malice, may amount to
negligence giving rise to the contractor’s / management’s
liability if in reaching its judgment it failed to exercise the
legally requisite level of skill (Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1
All ER 267).
By the same token, in designing an engineering
component a professional person or entity is required to
exercise due care and skill attached to a particular
profession which may be more onerous than that which an
ordinary individual is expected to exercise. The finished
product must be fit for its intended purpose (Independent
Broadcasting Authority v EMI Electronics Ltd and BICC
Construction Ltd [1980] 14 BLR 1).
In the event of a negligent act continuing, law would
expect the perpetrator of the act to deal with it as promptly
as possible. Herein lies the source of liability in the present
case – whether BP took sufficiently prompt action to cap
the source of spillage. If not, then the quantum of damages
will increase.
Two questions arise in this context: (a) whether BP
and/or its agent(s) was entirely negligent in capping the
sources of oil spillage, or (b) whether there was a natural
cause, such as an adverse condition at the bottom of the Gulf
of Mexico, which contributed to it. This information has
not been officially disclosed by BP. However, based on the
discussion above, it may be maintained that unless there was
evidence of contributory negligence, BP would not be able
to rely on the excuse that it made its “best endeavours” or
“best efforts” to deal with the cause of nuisance. The issue
of nuisance and its impact on the local community /
communities is considered in the next section of this article.
THE SOCIO-LEGAL IMPACT OF NUISANCE
CAUSED BY BP OR ITS AGENT(S)
The tort of nuisance can be either public or private.
Private nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a
private right to and enjoyment of land; this may arise out
of physical interference with property or a broader
interference with the use and enjoyment of proprietary
rights. Interference must be unreasonable in all the
circumstances. In order to determine the nature and
extent of interference the court would normally take into
account factors such as the location and character of the
land, the duration and the consequences of interference.
A public nuisance differs significantly from a private
nuisance; it usually takes place when an individual or a
corporate entity causes a nuisance which endangers the
property, health or comfort of the public generally or
prevents the public from exercising their rights. In Attorney-
General v DYA Quarries [1957] 2 QB 169 Denning LJ, as he
then was, stated inter alia (at pp 190-91) that:
“[A] public nuisance is a nuisance which is so widespread in
its range or so indiscriminate in its effect that it would not be
unreasonable to expect one person to take proceedings on his
own responsibility to put a stop to it, but that it should be
taken on the responsibility of the community at large.”
In the case of public nuisance, no privity between the
victims (the claimants) and the defendant is necessary;
however, although generally actions in public nuisance are
by the state, private individuals with locus standi can also
bring such actions on behalf of the victims.
Under US law, in order to make a claim on the grounds of
public nuisance, there must have taken place “an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the general public”
(Restatement (Second) of Torts 821 B(1) 834). Two criteria
are required to be satisfied for a nuisance to be treated as a
“public nuisance”: (a) that the nuisance must have adversely
affected safety, health, comfort or convenience of the public;
and (b) that it has become continuing in nature or has
produced permanent or long term effect which the defendant
knew or had reasons to know that it would produce such an
effect upon the public’s rights.
The high cost required for capping the leakage would
not be a defence for BP because the public interest
argument will overpower the high cost argument. In this
case, the claimants were not required to do anything to
reduce the costs; they only suffered both from
environmental and financial standpoints. In order to
establish that the defendants could have substantially
reduced the spillage of oil with the help of experts the
claimants can rely on Connecticut et al v American Electric Power
Company Inc et al (O4-CV-05669 – US District Court for
Southern District of New York). In that case, it was also
argued that, in general, the plaintiffs in all jurisdictions
would not only suffer economic losses arising from damage
to property and businesses but also that the defendant’s act
caused harm to public health and ecological harms, such as
the loss of forest and fishery biodiversity. The court found
against the defendants.
The classic case on this issue is the Bhopal Disaster case
(Union Carbide, supra) in December 1984. A chemical plant
owned and operated by Union Carbide India Limited was
located in the city of Bhopal, the State of Madhya Pradest,
India; but 50.9 per cent of its stock was owned by the
defendant, Union Carbide Corporation, a New York
company. On the night of the disaster, a lethal gas, methyl
isocyanate, leaked from the plant in substantial quantities
in consequence of which over 2,000 people died and over
200,000 suffered serious injuries. Livestock were killed,
crops damaged and many businesses were interrupted.22
Amicus Curiae Issue 84 Winter 2010
23
Amicus Curiae Issue 84 Winter 2010
Although the case primarily related to the issue of forum non
conveniens, it was revealed during the proceedings on at least
three occasions that Union Carbide (US) employees
conducted safety audits at the Bhopal plant; two accidents
had occurred previously at the plant, in consequence of
which many employees were injured. Union Carbide (US)
also allegedly assigned a key engineer to serve as UCCR
Bhopal project manager, and who “assumed responsibility
for virtually every aspect of the detailing of the process
design” (p 786). Apparently, only four visits were made by
Union Carbide process design engineers (US) to Bhopal.
Furthermore, Union Carbide decided to store certain
chemicals in large quantities at the Bhopal plant whereas
these should have been stored in small amounts for safety
reasons. Union Carbide (US) was also accused of the lack
of supervision of the plant in Bhopal – a case of corporate
negligence, contractual or otherwise.
In a much older case already referred to, Trail Smelter
Arbitration, the arbitration was concerned with the
settlement of the claims arising out of damage done in the
US to crops, pasture lands, trees and agriculture generally,
and livestock as the result of sulphur dioxide fumes emitted
from the smelting plant of the Consolidated Mining and
Smelting plant at Trail in British Columbia. Damage arising
from the dissolving of the sulphur fumes had considerably
increased since 1906, and especially since 1925. By the
treaty of 1909 an American-Canadian Joint Commission
was set up, but the Commission’s recommendations were
not accepted by these two governments. The dispute was
submitted to an arbitral tribunal, which was asked to
answer four questions centred around the issue of whether
the Trail Smelter was required to refrain from causing
damage in the State of Washington in the future, and if so,
to what extent. Furthermore, if the answer to the above
question was in the affirmative, then what measures or
regime should have been adopted and maintained by Trail
Smelter, and what indemnity or compensation should the
Trail Smelter have paid to the US Government?
BP’s case is very similar to Trail Smelter’s. The award of
the tribunal was, in reality, concerned with the principle of
state responsibility and nuisance. The tribunal found on
the evidence that the existence of an injury had been
proved. It then proceeded to ascertain the causes of the
injury, and reached the conclusion that:
“... the gases emerging from the stacks of the Trail Smelter
find their way in the upper air currents, and are carried by
these currents in a fairly continuous stream down the valley so
long as the prevailing wind at that level is in that direction”
(p 317).
As to state responsibility for injury emanating from its
territory (nuisance), the tribunal held that:
“... that under the principles of international law, as well as the
law of the United States, no State has the right to use or
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties
or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence”
(Decision No 2, AJIL 35 (1941) at 716).
“The Dominion of Canada is responsible in international law
for the conduct of the Trail Smelter. Apart from the
undertakings in the Convention, it is, therefore, the duty of
the Government of the Dominion of Canada to see to it that
this conduct should be in conformity with the obligation of
the Dominion under international law as herein determined”
(op cit at pp 716-17).
In the BP case, neither the State of Louisiana nor the
Federal authorities contributed to the negligent act and
nuisance; but it fell on the US government to arrange relief
to its citizens and take action against the wrongdoer. In the
Trail Smelter arbitration, the doctrine of imputability applied;
the Canadian Government could not avoid its responsibility
as the nuisance was caused from its territory. In the Corfu
Channel case (UK v Albania, ICJ Reports, 1949) the court
applied the same principle. In that case, the court found
that Albania was responsible for damage caused to British
warships owing to Albania’s failure to warn the British
authorities of the presence of mines in Albanian territorial
waters. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated,
inter alia, it is a general and well-recognised principle that:
“every State ... [has an] obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States” (op cit, at 22).
In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use
of the Nuclear Weapons (1996), the ICJ stated, inter alia, that:
“The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating
to the environment.”
In the BP case, the issue of the derivative obligation of
the state in which BP was registered was not raised, and if
it were raised, based on Trail Smelter it may be maintained
that the jurisdiction could have been held liable. BP
responded to the allegations made by the US Government,
and admitted its liability. It may be pointed out however
that in determining liability in the Trail Smelter, the arbitral
tribunal stated that:
“... this problem need not be solved here as the law followed
in the United States in dealing with the quasi-sovereign
rights of the States of the Union, in the matter of air
pollution, whilst more definite, is in conformity with the
general rules of international law” (op cit at 317).
Thus, even if there were a state-to-state litigation or
state-to-transnational corporation dispute it would be
governed by the general rules of international law. When
an international declaration or convention forms part of
the general corpus of international law, it is immaterial
whether a defendant state is a party to it or not.
WAS BP IN BREACH OF ITS CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY OR CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY?
The intention here is not to enter into the academic
debate on these two concepts which has been continuing
over the past 75 years or so, but to take a practical approach
to the concepts. Many authors have published books and
articles on the concept of corporate social responsibility, of
which a limited few are mentioned here: Berle and Mears,
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933); Goyder,
The Responsible Company (1961); Wedderburn, “The social
responsibilities of companies”, (1982) 15 Melbourne
University Law Review 1; Fogarty and Christie, Companies and
Communities: Promoting Business Involvement in the Community
(1990); and Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility
(1994). The concept of corporate social responsibility
evokes emotion in the minds of many. But what is the
extent of this responsibility, and what is its source? The
concept is unclear, and is emotionally-loaded.
The concept advocates that corporations must not do
anything through their activities whereby harm will be
caused to individuals or societies at large. But, this should be
part of corporate responsibility. When one refers to the
“harm” theory, one enters the zone of legal responsibilities
and obligations of actors in the business communities. The
law of negligence combined with contractual negligence
covers the so-called corporate social responsibility of
corporate entities. If, on the other hand, one maintains that
corporate entities have responsibilities towards societies and
social institutions, whether in the form of financial donations
or rendering aid and technical assistance in the form of
transfer of knowledge, then one will encounter difficulties in
identifying the legal bases for these responsibilities.
Profit-making corporate entities are first and foremost
accountable to their shareholders – there cannot be any
other arguments against that. The concept of “enlightened
shareholders” should not be confused with corporate
responsibility. Because of the primacy of their responsibility
towards their shareholders, responsible governments keep
them under control by making them subject to legislation
covering consumer protection, protection of the
environment, employment legislation etc so that they do
not cause harm to any individual and/or societies at large.
The concept of corporate social responsibility lacks any
legal base – it is based on the aspirations of its advocates.
Was BP in breach of corporate responsibility or
corporate social responsibility? BP was liable in breach of
corporate responsibility – it was liable in negligence and
contractual negligence, and whether it had social
responsibility or not, under the law of negligence it was
obliged to pay damages to the sufferers of the harm,
economic or otherwise. Having realised the extent of its
liability it presumably decided to pay damages rather than
become entangled in any prolonged litigation. The issue
remains on what bases were damages determined.
The cases discussed or referred to in this work – Trail
Smelter, Nuclear Weapons, Union Carbide – signify that these
accidents took place either through a lack of supervision by
the corporate entities concerned or negligence on their part.
The time has now come to extend the scope of responsibilities
for corporate entities through even more legislation.
CONCLUSIONS
In common law jurisdictions, in particular, liabilities
arising from corporate disasters can be dealt with by
applying the principles of the law of negligence. In earlier
cases however, on issues such as environmental pollution,
international law provides guidance unless the corpus of
customary international law has already identifiably
emerged in certain cases. It should be noted however that
the rules of international law cover the negligent acts of
transnational corporations although they are not subjects
of international law. In the case Concerning Barcelona Traction,
Light and Powder Company Ltd (Belgium v Spain) (ICJ, 1970),
the court stated that:
“... there exist basic obligations to the individual community
as a whole ... that can consequently be asserted by any State”
(at pp 172-73).
If BP was found to be exclusively negligent in
supervising and servicing technology in the Gulf of Mexico,
and delayed in correcting the instruments whereby a spill
could have been stopped much earlier, then of course BP
would be fully liable to pay compensation to the victims of
their negligence and clean up the environment. A mutually
agreed sum of compensation need not follow the standard
formulae used for computing compensation:
• the actual financial loss based on direct evidence;
• the potential financial loss based on the actual
financial loss;
• the total loss of business;
• the reduction of the value of land caused by the
nuisance.
(The Trail Smelter case outlined the heads of damages in
the case of trans-boundary environmental pollution).
The BP-Gulf of Mexico episode was one of many such
episodes. Whether one believes in corporate social
responsibility or corporate responsibility, the fact remains
that a wrongdoer has an obligation to correct the wrong
and place the victims in their original situation as soon as
possible. In the case of disasters of an extensive nature, the
defendant cannot rely on force majeure or accidental
wrongdoing.
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